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In this paper we evaluate what economists have learned over the past 40 years about the 
major determinants of crime.  We base our evaluation on two kinds of evidence: an examination 
of aggregate data over long time periods and across countries, and a critical review of the 
literature.  We argue that economists know little about the main factors identified in the 
economics of crime literature as key determinants of crime.  Even hypotheses that find some 
support in U.S. data for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across 
countries.  This conclusion applies both to policy variables like arrest rates or capital punishment 
and to less conventional factors such as abortion or gun laws.   
 
The hypothesis that drug prohibition generates violence, however, is generally consistent 
with the long time-series and cross-country facts.   This analysis is also consistent with a broader 
perspective in which government policies that affect the nature and amount of dispute resolution 
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I. Introduction 
  Since Gary Becker’s (1968) seminal article on the economic model of crime, economists 
have devoted considerable effort to determining its empirical validity.  Much of this research 
examines deterrence, the idea that policy can reduce crime by raising the expected costs.  This 
literature focuses in particular on arrest and incarceration rates, policing levels, and punishments 
like the death penalty.  Considerable additional research, while not directly focused on deterrence, 
considers hypotheses derived from economic models and uses statistical techniques commonly 
employed by economists.  Such hypotheses include, among others, the roles of abortion 
legalization, gun laws, guns, lead, and drug prohibition in causing crime. 
  In this paper we evaluate what economists have learned over the past 40 years about the 
major determinants of crime.  We consider both the policy variables related to deterrence and the 
more unconventional factors examined by economists.  We rely on two kinds of evidence:  an 
examination of aggregate data over long time periods and across countries, and a critical review 
of the literature. 
  Our empirical strategy consists mainly of plots that, one-by-one, compare crime rates 
with potential determinants; that is, we examine the univariate, “non-instrumented,” relation 
between crime and possible explanatory factors.   This approach suffers two large defects: the 
right model of crime is undoubtedly multifactorial, and the raw correlation between crime and a 
potential determinant can be misleading in the presence of endogeneity. 
  We nevertheless argue that examining the data in this fashion sheds considerable light on 
which determinants of crime are empirically important.   This approach shows that the raw 
correlations in the data are frequently the wrong sign relative to standard models or claims.  This 
does not prove a multivariate, “instrumented” analysis would not uncover a different effect, but it 
suggests this outcome is not especially likely and that any instrument would have to exert a strong 
impact on the endogenous variable to reverse the raw correlation.   We also show, moreover, that 
a multivariate approach (admittedly, one that is not well-identified) fails to display the “correct” 3 
correlations in the vast majority of cases. 
Based on this evaluation, we argue that economists know little about the main factors 
identified in the economics of crime literature as key determinants of crime.  This conclusion 
applies both to policy variables like arrest rates or capital punishment and to indirect factors such 
as abortion or gun laws.  The reason is that even hypotheses that find some support in U.S. data 
for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across countries.  Thus, 
these hypotheses are less persuasive than a focus on recent U.S. evidence might suggest. 
The hypothesis that drug prohibition generates violence, however, is consistent with the 
long time-series and cross-country facts.  Previous research has considered this hypothesis; we 
focus on a broader set of data and show the potentially large role that drug prohibition plays in 
determining violence.  The evidence we present is only suggestive, but it indicates this hypothesis 
deserves further exploration.  This analysis is also consistent with a general perspective in which 
government policies that affect the amount and nature of dispute resolution play an important role 
in determining violence. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we present basic facts about crime over the 
past century in the United States and other countries.  Section 3 examines whether individual 
deterrence variables appear to explain crime.  Section 4 considers alternative determinants of 
crime, while Section 5 considers the role of drug prohibition, still focusing on explanatory 
variables one by one.  Section 6 presents OLS regressions that potentially account for multiple 
determinants of crime.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Stylized Facts 
Recent research on crime typically uses the past several decades of U.S. data.  This is in 
part because data on crime and its possible determinants are more readily available for this 
period, in part because crime data for other countries are less readily available or difficult to 
compare to U.S. data.  This focus also occurs because crime has fluctuated substantially during 4 
the past several decades in the U.S., making it an inherently interesting period. 
It is nevertheless possible and interesting to consider longer time series and, in some 
cases, data from other countries.  Crime varies substantially across time and space, so a broader 
perspective can support or refute hypotheses of interest.  We begin, therefore, by establishing key 
facts about crime over the long run and across countries. 
  Figure 1 presents the violent crime and property crime rates in the U.S. over the period 
1932-2006.   The data are from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.  All data are in per capita 
terms. 
  Violent crime began to rise in the mid-1960s and increased overall until the early 1990s, 
when it began a persistent decline.  The decline was substantial, but even by 2006 violent crime 
was still well above its level in the 1940s and 1950s.  Some of the upward trend might reflect 
changes in crime reporting, so the measured difference between 2006 and the 1950s may 
overstate the true change. 
  Property crime behaves similarly to violent crime.  Property crime increased beginning in 
the mid-1960s and remained substantially higher from the 1970s through the present compared to 
the 1940s and 1950s.  Violent crime and property crime differ somewhat after 1970, with 
property crime peaking in 1980 rather than in the early 1990s.  Property crime did increase during 
the latter half of the 1980s, but less so than violent crime. 
  Figure 2 presents the murder rate and the homicide rate.  The murder rate is from the 
same source as the violent and property crime rates; the homicide rate is from vital statistics 
sources and is available for a longer time period.
1    Murder behaves similarly to the overall 
violent crime rate.  The murder rate increased substantially in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
displayed a marked increase in the 1980s, and a dramatic decline in the 1990s.  The murder rate 
declined between the 1930s and the 1950s, however, while the violent crime rate did not.  More 
                                                 
1 Data for the early years are problematic due to changes in the coverage area and underreporting of 
homicide, so we employ an adjusted series for 1900-1932 (Eckberg 1995).  
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importantly, the decline in the murder rate during the 1990s returned to virtually its 1960s level, 
while violent crime remains well above its 1960s levels.  The decline in the murder rate also 
appears to have abated by the end of the sample.  The homicide rate behaves similarly to the 
murder rate, but the pre-1950s decline is more apparent.
2  In addition, the homicide rate displays 
a persistent increase over the first three decades of the century and an enormous decline during 
the 1930s. 
  What these data show is that U.S. crime exhibited substantial variation well before the 
1980s and 1990s, with fluctuations in both directions.  The homicide rate does not show an 
overall upward trend, although this might reflect changing medical technology in the treatment of 
gun shots and other serious injuries.
3  A convincing explanation of crime can ideally account for 
all of this variation, not just the past two decades. 
  We turn next to data for other countries.  We focus on vital statistics measures of the 
homicide rate, since this series is more accurately and consistently reported than most crime 
statistics. 
  Figure 3 shows homicide rates for Canada, the U.K. and Australia over time.  The 
average level of homicide has been substantially lower in these three countries than in the U.S. 
over the same period.  Homicide nevertheless displays substantial variation, and this variation is 
broadly similar to that in the United States.  Homicide rates rose during the 1960s and early 1970s 
but then declined over the remaining part of the sample.   This similarity raises doubt about US-
specific explanations for the major fluctuations in crime. 
  Table 1 compares homicide rates across countries.  Among OECD countries, the U.S. is a 
major outlier, with a homicide rate in 2001 of 7.06 compared to the OECD average of 1.62.  
Compared to a broader set of countries, however, the U.S. homicide rate is less unusual.  The 
                                                 
2 Deaths resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks are recorded as homicides but not as murders. 
 
3 See Harris et al. (2002).  This decline in murder would tend to increase reported assaults since some of 
those assaulted do not die.  
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average for all countries in the sample is 6.28, and 19 countries have rates in excess of the U.S. 
rate, sometimes by substantial amounts.  The most extreme case is Colombia, where the homicide 
rate is 62.38.   
  A convincing account of the determinants of homicide, therefore, should explain not only 
the fluctuations over recent decades in the U.S. but also longer term fluctuations in the U.S. and 
in other countries.  Likewise, a complete account should explain the differences in homicide 
across countries.  In particular, this account should explain why the U.S. has a higher rate than 
most “similar” countries but a lower rate than a broad range of other countries. 
  
3. Determinants of Crime: Deterrence Variables 
  In this section we explore the crime-reducing effect of deterrence variables like the arrest 
or incarceration rate.  These variables are in principle controllable by policy, and they affect 
crime either by raising the expected cost of crime or by incapacitating criminals.  We consider 
these variables in the context of the stylized facts above.
4 
The first variable of interest is arrests per capita, which is a proxy for the probability that 
a criminal offender is caught by the criminal justice system and subjected to punishment.  Other 
things equal, a higher probability of arrest should imply a lower incidence of crime.  The ideal 
proxy would be arrests per crime, and part of the literature considers this measure.  Given the 
likelihood of measurement error in both crime and arrest counts, however, arrests per crime and 
crime per capita almost certainly show a strong negative correlation due to “ratio bias,” regardless 
of the true relation.  We focus, therefore, on arrests per capita. 
  Figures 4a–4c show arrest rates over time for violent crime, property crime, and murder, 
along with the related crime rate. The first-order fact is that arrest rates and crime correlate 
positively, contrary to what should occur if the main operative mechanism is that higher arrest 
                                                 
4 For an early attempt to develop and test the implications of the deterrence model, see Ehrlich (1973).  For 
reviews of the literature and related work on deterrence, see Cameron (1988), Benson, Kim, and 
Rassmussen (1994), Ehrlich (1996), Nagin (1997), Freeman (1999), and Levitt (2004). 7 
probabilities reduce crime.  This positive correlation does not prove the arrest probability has no 
deterrent effect, nor does it imply that higher arrests increase crime.  Instead, it likely indicates 
that a third factor is simultaneously driving both crime and arrests.  For example, political 
economy considerations could cause arrest rates to respond positively to crime rates.  
Alternatively, the strong positive relation might be a reporting effect, since recording of crime 
and arrests tends to go together.  The fact that the correlation is positive, however, raises doubt as 
to whether arrests have a major deterrent effect, and it suggests that an appropriate instrument 
would have to be powerful to overcome the inherent endogeneity in the arrest rate. 
  A second key deterrence variable is the size of the police force.  Though it might seem 
obvious that police should reduce crime, this implication is not immediate.  The standard model 
of crime identifies the probabilities of arrest and conviction, along with the expected punishment, 
as the primary deterrence variables.  If these are held constant, police per se should have no 
additional impact.  In practice, comparing police and crime makes sense for several reasons.  
Counting the number of police is easier than assessing arrest probabilities, and the probability of 
arrest is plausibly increasing in the size of the police force.  Also, the relation between police and 
crime does not suffer from ratio bias.  Despite the plausibility of the hypothesis, however, a long 
literature has found it difficult to confirm an effect of police on crime.
5  This is plausibly because 
jurisdictions with high crime rates tend to hire more police.  In principle one can address this by 
finding an appropriate instrument, but in practice such instruments are rare.
6   
  Figure 5 plots police personnel and police officers per capita in the U.S. from 1934 to 
2006.  The number of police crept upward in the early part of the period, increased more rapidly 
in the late 1960s, flattened out in the 1970s, and increased through 1999.  The number of police 
                                                 
5 See the discussion in Cameron (1988), Cronwell and Trumbell (1994), or Moody and Marvell (1996). 
 
6 Levitt (1997) attempts to solve the endogeneity problem using the timing of mayoral and gubernatorial 
election cycles and finds a strong negative impact of police on crime. The results are sensitive, however, to 
a coding error (McCrary 2002).  
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officers increased less rapidly than police employees although a similar peak occurs in 1999.  The 
steady, slight increase in police occurred simultaneously with large fluctuations in crime rates.  
Police and crime both increase in the 1960s; declines in crime begin years before the decline in 
police at the turn of the 21
st century.  Thus, the overall correlation between police and crime is the 
opposite of what is implied by the deterrence hypothesis. 
  The perverse correlation does not prove deterrence is wrong or that police increase crime.  
These data, however, make clear the hurdle any structural estimation must overcome: the 
dominant variation in the data is in the wrong direction, so any instrument would need to be 
powerful to find a negative effect of police on crime.  The perverse correlation also suggests 
skepticism about the effectiveness of this aspect of the deterrence hypothesis. 
  A third key “deterrence” variable is the incarceration rate.  Incarceration can affect crime 
through several channels.  First, the threat of incarceration can raise the expected punishment for 
crime.  Second, persons in prison cannot commit crimes against the non-prison population.  Both 
channels imply that greater incarceration leads to less crime.  A possibly offsetting effect is that 
incarceration might make some persons more criminogenic due to lost human capital, peer effects 
(hardening), or increased criminal capital.
7  Thus, the magnitude and possibly the sign of any 
incarceration effect can only be determined empirically.   
  Much of the literature suggests a small, crime-reducing effect of incarceration on net, but 
some research suggests a zero or even perverse effect.
8  One possible interpretation is that the true 
effect is negative but reverse causation biases the coefficient toward zero, since a higher crime 
rate likely implies more incarcerations.  As in the arrests and police literature, the key empirical 
                                                 
7 Chen and Shapiro (2004), for example, provide evidence of a hardening effect.  
 
8 See Johnson and Raphael (2006) for a recent review of the literature.  Abrams (2006) provides evidence 
based on add-on gun laws that incarceration deters crime, while Kessler and Levitt (1999) document both a 
deterrent and an incapacitation effect based on sentence enhancements.  Webster, Doob, and Zimring 
(2006) critique Kessler and Levitt (1999); Levitt (2006) responds. 
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issue is therefore whether an appropriate instrument exists.
9 
Figure 6 presents the incarceration rate for the U.S. over 1925-2006.  After fluctuating in 
a relatively narrow range from 1925 – 1970, the incarceration rate began increasing in the early 
1970s at a steady rate and has now reached a level almost 5 times the average rate over the pre-
1970 period.
10   
This figure poses a challenge for the view that incarceration reduces crime.  Starting 
around 1990, the incarceration rate climbs while the crime rate falls drastically, which is 
consistent with the view that incarceration reduces crime.  During the early part of the sample, 
however, crime fluctuated substantially while the incarceration rate did not.  In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, both rates climbed simultaneously, the opposite of what deterrence and 
incapacitation imply.  The average level of the incarceration rate, moreover, is much higher in the 
past several decades, so even a small causal effect of incarceration in reducing crime implies 
much lower crime than now observed. 
  Further evidence on the relation between incarceration and crime comes from cross-
country comparisons.  Figures 7a-c show scatter plots of homicide and incarceration rates for 
several groups of countries.   The first consists of the 58 countries with available data on both 
incarceration rates and homicide.
11  This figure suggests a positive correlation between 
incarceration rates and homicide rates, but it is dominated by a few countries that plausibly differ 
across multiple dimensions from the remaining countries.  The second figure shows data for the 
                                                 
9 Levitt (1996) uses lagged judicial decisions to circumvent this problem.  This instrument does not satisfy 
the exclusion restriction, however, if the error term is serially correlated.  Also, the first stage F-statistics 
are well below 10 in many cases.  Johnson and Raphael (2006), using a different identification scheme, find 
evidence consistent with Levitt but show the effect of incarceration has become much weaker in recent 
years. 
 
10 The average incarceration rate from 1925-1969 is 108 prisoners per 100,000. The incarceration rate in 
2006 was 497 per 100,000. The average incarceration rate from 1970-2006 is 280.  
 
11 Walmsley (2004) provides incarceration rates for 205 independent countries and dependent territories 
and reports that 62.5% of countries have incarceration rates below 150 per 100,000. 
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OECD countries.  These again suggest a strong positive relation between homicide and 
incarceration, but the U.S. is an extreme outlier.  The third figure excludes the U.S. and still 
shows a significant, positive correlation.  Yet again one cannot draw a structural conclusion, but 
the strong, perverse correlation between homicide and incarceration should make one cautious in 
accepting the proposition that increased incarceration reduces crime.   
  A final deterrence variable that economists link to crime, especially homicide, is capital 
punishment.  According to the deterrence model, imposing capital punishment rather than life 
imprisonment increases the expected cost of crime, thereby reducing crimes like murder.  Initial 
empirical work based on aggregate U.S. data appeared to suggest that capital punishment reduces 
homicide (Ehrlich 1975, 1977), but subsequent work raised doubts about this conclusion (e.g., 
Passell and Taylor, 1977).
12  Due to the Supreme Court’s re-instatement of the death penalty in 
1976 and the subsequent increase in executions during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as renewed 
political interest in the death penalty, several papers have re-examined the issue using post-
moratorium, state-level data.  Most of these papers claim to find a significant deterrent effect, but 
many of the results are not robust to reasonable modifications of the statistical specification.
13  
More broadly, Donohue and Wolfers (2005) argue that the evidence does not support a 
substantial deterrent effect of the death penalty. 
  We review here the first-order facts related to capital punishment.  Figure 8 plots the 
                                                 
12 The single most important critique is that the results are highly sensitive to sample period and/or 
functional form.  This is because the last few years of the sample had zero executions.  If one excludes 
these, as seen below, the correlation between executions and homicide is positive.  If one includes these in 
a linear specification, the correlation is still positive.  The original Ehrlich paper, however, used the log of 
executions and assumed a small number of executions to avoid taking the log of zero. 
 
13 See, for example, Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, Shepherd (2003), Mocan and Gittings (2003), Shepherd (2004) 
and Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006).  Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd and Shepherd fail to use state 
trends and/or clustered standard errors. Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s results are sensitive to measuring 
executions in levels rather than adjusted for population.  Mocan and Gittings results are sensitive to the 
assumed lag between executions and murders.  Mocan and Gittings (2006) argue that the theoretically 
sound assumption about this lag supports an effect of the death penalty, but their case for the assumed lag is 
not persuasive.  Katz, Levitt, and Shustorivich (2003) fail to find an economically or statistically significant 
effect of the death penalty.   Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin (2007) find limited evidence for a 
deterrent effect. 
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number of executions in the U.S. against the homicide rate.
14  In some sub-periods the correlation 
is negative, as implied by deterrence hypothesis, but in other sub-periods the correlation is 
positive.  For example, executions increased rapidly while murder fell during the 1990s, but from 
1900 to the early 1960s executions and homicide moved together.  During the moratorium period, 
murder fluctuated considerably even though the number of executions was zero.
15 
  Figure 9a graphs similar data for Canada from 1926 through 2005.  The first 40 years 
showed substantial variation in the number of executions while the homicide rate remained 
relatively stable.  The correlation for 1926-2005 is significantly negative (-0.59, p-value  0.00), 
consistent with a deterrent effect of capital punishment.  For the time period 1926-1962, however, 
the correlation is significantly positive (0.34, p-value = 0.039.)
16  In the last 40 years, homicide 
has fluctuated substantially while the execution rate has been constant at zero.   Thus, the overall 
negative correlation is an artifact of two very different regimes; in one the correlation is perverse, 
and in the other it is zero. 
  Figure 9b demonstrates a similar result for the U.K.  Homicides per capita fluctuated 
substantially over the past 40 years despite an almost complete absence of executions.  Thus, the 
data provide little affirmative evidence that is consistent with the standard deterrence story. 
   
  Discussion 
  The results above present a challenge to key aspects of the deterrence model of crime.   
An important feature of this model is the implication that policy can reduce crime by 
manipulating variables such as arrest rates, policing levels, and so on.  The aggregate data do not 
provide much confirmation for this perspective, at least not in a simplistic, “more X, less crime” 
                                                 
14 For the homicide rate we use vital statistics homicides, adjusted by Eckberg (1995). 
 
15 For 1900-2005 (full sample) the correlation is -0.11, p-value = 0.28; for 1900-1955 it is 0.34, p-
value=0.012; and for 1956-2005 it is -0.60, p-value=0.000. 
 
16 For the time period 1926-1966, the correlation becomes an insignificant 0.24, p-value = 0.128. 
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kind of way. 
  This conclusion in no way suggests that criminals are not rational or that they fail to 
respond to incentives.   On the one hand, the analysis above is too “broad brush” to support such 
a specific claim.  On the other hand, numerous analyses do find that criminals respond to 
incentives in roughly rational ways; this research, however, focuses on responses that are local or 
in response to specific and unambiguous changes or differences in the incentives faced by 
criminals.
17  So, we do not mean to throw out the baby with the bath water by arguing against the 
deterrence model at a general level or minimizing its usefulness as an organizing device.   We are 
instead focusing on specific, policy-relevant implications, and we are addressing the naïve, “if we 
hire more police, or make more arrests, or lock more people up, that will necessarily reduce 
crime” perspective.   This application of the deterrence model is not supported by the data.  A key 
question, then, is why we do not find more evidence of deterrence with respect to these variables.   
  One possibility is that data limitations make it difficult to test these hypotheses in the 
settings where they are most relevant.  For example, it could be that going from no police force to 
some police force indeed reduces crime, but the observed variation in the size of modern police 
forces is over a range where diminishing returns have set in so that additional police have little 
impact.   Thus, our evidence cannot rule out the possibility that adding more police is unlikely to 
lower crime, but substantially reducing police might increase crime. 
  A different hypothesis is that most existing analyses, even those using city- or state-level 
data, are too aggregated with respect to time period, place, type of crime, and type of police effort 
to uncover a number of effects that might operate in practice.   Thus, while putting more police on 
the street in a specific neighborhood and instructing them to target a particular kind of crime 
might indeed reduce that kind of crime in that neighborhood, especially in the short term, simply 
hiring more police who sit behind desks pushing paper is unlikely to reduce any kind of crime. 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), Klick and Tabarrok (2005), Draca, Machin, and 
Witt (2007), and Iyengar (2008). 
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  A third hypothesis is that deterrence variables might have counterproductive effects as 
well as some beneficial effects.   Some expansions of police might increase crime, as discussed 
below, because the police work at enforcing drug prohibition or other counter-productive 
activities.
18   In the case of capital punishment, the reality might be that criminals pay 
considerable attention to the expected costs but that executions are rare, so it is approximately 
rational to ignore the possibility of being executed.
19  Regarding the effect of incarceration via 
deterrence, it might be that some criminals do not regard prison as worse than life outside or view 
the negative impacts on their future lives once released as small.   Kling (2006), for example, 
finds that incarceration has minimal impact on post-incarceration employment and earnings. 
  A different reason the key policy variables in the deterrence model may have small 
effects on crime is that the underlying behavioral parameters of criminals do not imply a big 
response.   Criminals may be people with high discount rates and/or myopic preferences, in which 
case the threat of future punishment should play a relatively small role.
20  
  Thus, while one interpretation of our deterrence results is that economists do not have the 
right data to find these effects, an alternative, reasonable interpretation is that increases in the 
standard deterrence variables have small or perverse effects over the relevant range. 
  
4.  Alternative Determinants of Crime 
  Perhaps due to the difficulties in establishing links between policy variables and crime, 
economists have considered a number of alternative explanations.  In this section we examine 
                                                 
18 For example, Iyengar (2007) finds that laws mandating arrest for reports of domestic violence increase 
intimate homicides, plausibly because the laws reduce reporting of initial violent acts. 
 
19 In the U.S. in recent years, the number of executions per year has been less than 100 while the number of 
homicides has been over 20,000. 
 
20 Lee and McCrary (2005) provide evidence consistent with this view.   Lochner (2003) finds that 
individual beliefs about the probability of arrest are substantially idiosyncratic and not responsive to local 
neighborhood conditions.  These beliefs do adjust in response to individual arrest experience, however, and 
these beliefs do correlate with criminal behavior.  
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several that have received significant attention in recent years.  Our assessment is that none 
provides a convincing explanation for a substantial fraction of the variation in crime. 
  In a provocative paper, Lott and Mustard (1997) (LM) argue that laws protecting the right 
to carry a concealed gun (RTC laws) increase concealed carry and therefore reduce crime by 
causing criminals to worry their intended targets might be armed.  LM also suggest that RTC 
laws cause criminals to substitute away from crimes against persons, like murder, rape, robbery, 
and assault, to crimes “against” property, like burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  The original LM 
analysis appeared to find that RTC laws reduce violent crime and increase property crime, 
consistent with the a priori considerations.  Subsequent research, however, has raised questions 
about the LM conclusions, while Lott has defended these conclusions.
21 
  We re-consider the LM hypothesis using long-run, aggregate data.  Figure 10 shows the 
fraction of the U.S. population living under RTC laws in each year since 1900.  The fraction rose 
steadily and substantially starting in the mid-1980s, yet violent crime does not fall until the 
1990s.  Despite an enormous change in the fraction of the population living in a state covered by 
an RTC law, crime has neither sky-rocketed nor plummeted over the sample.  The homicide rate, 
in particular, shows no particular trend, and this is a crime category that is most plausibly affected 
by RTC laws.  Thus neither the view that RTC laws increase crime, nor the view that RTC laws 
decrease crime, receives obvious support from the aggregate data. 
  In contrast to the hypothesis that gun laws reduce crime, a different literature considers 
whether guns themselves cause crime.
22    We again confront this hypothesis with aggregate level 
data.  Figure 11 shows the stock of guns over time in conjunction with the violent crime rate.  
Crime declines numerous times, including a major decline from 1990 onward, despite a large and 
ever-increasing stock of guns.   This makes it implausible that guns per se play a large role in 
                                                 
21 For critiques of the LM analysis, see Black and Nagin (1998), Ayres and Donohue (2003a, 2003b), and 
Helland and Tabarrok (2004).   For responses, see Lott (1998, 2003) and Plassmann and Whitley (2003). 
 
22 For a recent summary and critique of this literature, see National Research Council (2005). 
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causing crime, although it does not rule out some role. 
  A different hypothesis that has received enormous attention is that legalization of 
abortion in the early 1970s caused a substantial fraction of the decline in crime during the 1990s 
(Donohue and Levitt, 2001).  The logic is that access to legal abortion allows women to have 
children in environments less likely to produce future criminals.  Thus, cohorts born after 
legalization should have a lower propensity to commit crime.  Further, crime should have begun 
falling about 15 years after legalization and continued falling as successive cohorts born after 
legalization entered their high crime years.  Donohue and Levitt (2001) provide evidence that 
appears consistent with their hypothesis, stating in particular that “legalized abortion appears to 
account for as much as 50 percent of the recent drop in crime” (p.379).  Several authors, however, 
have disputed the DL conclusion, while DL have responded with evidence that claims to validate 
their original position.
23     
  We revisit this issue using aggregate and cross-country data.  Figures 12a-c compare the 
abortion rate in the U.S. lagged 20 years with the violent crime, property crime, and homicide 
rates.  The figures show visually what we know from history: no legal abortions occurred before 
1970, and the legalization in 70-73 could not have affected crime rates before the late 1980s.  
Nevertheless, major fluctuations in crime occurred before 1990.  This does not mean abortion 
legalization played no role in the declines in the past two decades, but the magnitude of legalized 
abortion’s impact on crime is likely modest or confined to only the most recent period.
24 
  Figure 13 shows the homicide rates in a number of other countries that have legalized or 
substantially liberalized abortion access.  The evidence from these countries provides little 
                                                 
23  See Joyce (2003, 2009), Lott and Whitley (2007), Foote and Goetz (2008), and Dills and Miron (2006), 
for critiques, and Donohue and Levitt (2004, 2008) for responses. 
 
24 We note that Donohue and Levitt emphasize the role of abortion legalization in explaining the decline in 
crime in the 1990s; they do not assert that abortion policy explains the longer time series.  They do claim 
that legalization explains as much as half of the decline in the 1990s.  Our view is therefore that if several 
other substantial declines in crime have occurred, during periods when abortion legalization could not have 
played a role, this should introduce some caution about the quantitative importance during recent decades. 
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support for hypothesis that legalizing abortion reduces crime.  While the data from some 
countries are consistent with the DL hypothesis (e.g. Canada, France, Italy), several countries’ 
data show the opposite correlation (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Poland).  In other cases 
crime was falling before legalization and does not decline any more quickly (20 years) after 
legalization (e.g. Japan, Norway).
25 
  A final hypothesis recently advanced to explain the variation in homicide rates is 
exposure to lead through paint or gasoline.  According to this hypothesis, this exposure generates 
aggressive, anti-social behavior and violent tendencies later in life.  Reyes (2007) and Nevin 
(2007) argue that laws restricting the use of lead have reduced this exposure and contributed to 
the recent decline in violent crime. 
  Figure 14 plots the U.S. murder rate and a measure of environmental lead exposure 
lagged 20 years for 1961 through 2005. During some parts of the sample, the correlation is 
positive, consistent with the Reyes/Nevin hypothesis, but in other time periods, especially the late 
1960s to the mid-1980s, the correlation is negative or zero.
 26  Further, lead exposure falls to 
virtually nil by the end of the sample, yet crime appears to have leveled off.  This makes the case 
for the lead hypothesis highly dependent upon the time period examined. 
Figure 15 shows alternative measurements of lead exposure based on motor vehicle or 
motor fuel data.  All proxies for lead increased dramatically from around 1910 through 1970.  If 
the lead hypothesis is correct, then crime should have displayed a measurable increase between 
1925 and 1985.  The U.S. murder rate, however, decreased between the 1930s and 1950s.  The 
murder rate does rise from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, but much unexplained variation 
remains between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. 
Our bottom line assessment on all these hypotheses is therefore as follows:  each may 
                                                 
25 For a related analysis that reaches a similar conclusion, see Kahane, Paton, and Simmons (2008). 
 
26 For 1961-1974, the correlation is -0.5762 (p-value = 0.0310).  Between 1975 and 1992 the correlation is 
0.2181 (p-value = 0.3846) and between 1993 and 2005 the correlation is 0.3331 (p-value = 0.2661).  17 
contain an element of truth, and nothing we have done proves they are false.   Any claim that 
these hypotheses explain large components of the fluctuations in crime, however, does not seem 
consistent with the aggregate data. 
 
5. Drug Prohibition 
  The analysis above leaves a puzzle: why has crime fluctuated over the past several 
decades, and why are crime rates so different across countries?  One possibility is that reporting 
conventions differ over time and place, and this undoubtedly plays a role for many crime 
categories and perhaps even for the most consistently reported crime series, homicide.   The 
differences across time and space, however, seem too dramatic for this to be the main story. 
  We believe instead that a different mechanism, in both a general and a specific form, 
explains much of the variation in crime—especially violent crime—both over time and across 
countries.  This hypothesis is that violence is more common when and where mechanisms for 
non-violent dispute resolution are not readily available.  This view has two implications.   
  At a general level, countries with weak systems for defining and enforcing property rights 
are likely to see elevated violence because market participants cannot use courts or non-violent 
adjudication methods backed up by the courts.  This is consistent with the fact that many former 
Soviet republics and some developing economies have high homicide rates.  In these countries 
the rules are not always clear, and the government system for enforcing the rules is not effective.  
Countries with weak systems for defining and enforcing property rights are plausibly also ones in 
which property crimes like theft would be common. 
  At a specific level, the view that violence occurs when alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms are not available implies that if government forces a market underground, 
participants substitute violence for other dispute-resolution mechanisms.  The best example is 
drug prohibition; by forcing drug markets underground, prohibition encourages the use of 
violence to resolve disputes.  In particular, greater enforcement of prohibition makes it harder for 18 
suppliers and demanders to circumvent the prohibition legally (for example, by obtaining the 
prohibited goods through medical channels).  Enforcement also re-allocates property rights and 
upsets reputations, so the ability of private parties to establish non-violent dispute resolution 
diminishes with greater enforcement, while the number of disputes likely increases.  Thus, more 
enforcement means a larger black market and more scope for violent dispute resolution.
27 
  This hypothesis is related to, but partially distinct from, the “crack cocaine” hypothesis 
advanced in Fryer, Heaton, Levitt and Murphy (2005) (FHLM).  FHLM suggest that the major 
upturn in violence in the 1980s and the subsequent decline in the 1990s resulted from crack’s 
introduction and spread.  When crack arrived in cities beginning in the early 1980s, the property 
rights to distribution (e.g., street corners) were not assigned, and since crack dealers could not use 
advertising or lawsuits to capture market share or property rights, they used violence instead.  
Over time, according to FHLM, these property rights evolved (de facto), so violence subsided.   
  We agree with this hypothesis as far as it goes, but we argue it is incomplete.  First, 
disputes arise in markets for many reasons beyond the initial assignment of property rights, and 
these disputes would presumably continue as long as a market operates.  Second, the FHLM 
hypothesis does not explain fluctuations in violence outside the sample of the 1980s and early 
1990s, or in other countries. 
  The “drug enforcement-generates-violence” hypothesis, however, potentially explains 
differences in crime across a broad range of time and space.  Drug and alcohol prohibition 
enforcement have varied substantially over the past 80 years, which might explain fluctuations in 
U.S. violence over that time period.  Similarly, prohibition enforcement differs across countries in 
ways that potentially explain differences in violence. 
  Drug enforcement might also explain variation in crime categories other than murder and 
assault.  An increase in drug prices from increased enforcement may cause income-generating 
                                                 
27 See Goldstein (1985), Goldstein et al. (1989) and Miron (2001) for further discussion. 19 
crime such as robbery, larceny, burglary, or auto theft.  If increased police effort to enforce drug 
prohibition comes at the expense of other activities, deterrence for non-drug crimes might decline 
as enforcement increases.  Further, increased incarceration of drug prisoners might overcrowd 
prisons and cause early release of non-drug prisoners, implying additional non-drug crime.  
Finally, incarceration of drug prisoners might cause people with generally low criminal proclivity 
to become more criminogenic.
28 
  Figure 16 presents data on expenditure for enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition 
over time in the United States.
29  These data are broadly consistent with the view that differences 
in violence and perhaps other crime as well, result to a significant degree from differences in 
enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition.  The variations over time correlate well with the 
murder and homicide rates and, to a lesser degree, with the overall violent and property crime 
rates.
30  The relatively high rate of homicide in the U.S. compared to Europe is consistent with the 
fact that European countries enforce drug prohibition to a far lesser degree (Miron 2001).   The 
relatively high homicide rates in various drug source countries (Colombia, Mexico) is further 
evidence consistent with the enforcement hypothesis.
31 
                                                 
28 An effect might also operate in the other direction; locking up people who commit both drug crime and 
non-drug crime might lower general crime (Kuziemko and Levitt 2004). 
 
29 The data are based on those in Miron (1999). 
 
30 The increases in crime in the 1960s seem to predate the increases in enforcement.  One possibility is that 
the baby boom generation was entering its teens and twenties, which in part caused the increase in both 
crime and enforcement.   In the regressions reported in Section 6, we control for demographics. 
 
31 Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002) use panel data for a large sample of developed and developing 
countries to examine the determinants of violent crime.  They find some evidence that being a drug 
producer or having a high drug possession arrest rate is associated with more violence.  Grogger and Willis 
(2000) find that rise in urban crime rates in the 1980s is strongly correlated with the introduction of crack 
cocaine.  Some interpret this as suggesting crack has an independent, psycho-pharmacological effect in 
causing crime, but the correlation is more consistent with the FHLM story (since crack remained but crime 
declined).  Goldstein et al (1989) provide micro evidence that crime during the crack epidemic in New 
York City in 1988 resulted from disputes related to the drug trade.  Dobkin and Nicosia (2008) provide 
evidence against the view that drug use per se causes crime.  Prasad (2009) finds that economic 
liberalization in India, which brought much informal activity into the legal sector, was accompanied by a 





6. An Accounting Exercise 
 
  The discussion so far has considered potential crime determinants one by one, and it has 
relied on raw rather than “instrumented” correlations.   In this section we address the first of these 
issues by considering regressions of crime rates on a multitude of possible determinants.   We 
make no attempt to address the second issue because we are pessimistic that valid instruments 
exist at this level of aggregation.
32  Indeed, even finely tuned or clever instruments are often not 
compelling in practice, either because they have low explanatory power or are not really 
themselves exogenous.
33  Further, calculating accurate standards error is often difficult in 
standard panel regressions (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
  Table 2 shows regressions of various crime rates on measures of arrests, police, 
incarceration, executions, RTC laws, abortion, lead, and drug and alcohol prohibition 
enforcement.
34  The regressions also control for several factors that we have not examined 
explicitly:  the age structure, economic conditions, and education.  The existing literature 
provides some confirmation that each of these plays a role, although this evidence is less 
                                                 
32 Fisher and Nagin (1978) is the classic reference on the difficulty of identifying the crime function. 
 
33 On the problems created by weak instruments, see Staiger and Stock (1997). 
 
34 The regression includes a time trend, logged GNP per capita measured in 1992 dollars from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, the fraction of the population aged 15 to 24 from the Census Bureau, and the 
fraction of the population with at least a high school diploma from the Census Bureau. Most other factors 
are lagged one year. These include real prohibition expenditures per capita (from the Budget of the United 
States), the percent of the population covered by right to carry laws (from Grossman and Lee (2008) and 
the Census Bureau), the incarceration rate (from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics), the arrest 
rate (from the FBI’s UCR from various years), police employees per capita (from the FBI’s UCR), and the 
stock of handguns per capita (from Kleck, 1997). CDC abortions are included measured in thousands and 
lagged 20 years. The Reyes (2007) measure of lead exposure in kilotons per million population is included 
lagged 20 years. In a few cases, a variable was missing data for a limited number of years. We linearly 
interpolated values for these missing observations. In particular, we interpolated values for police in 1936-
1938, 1942, and 1952; for the arrest rates in 1950 and 1957; and the percent high school graduate for 1956, 
1957, 1959, 1962, and 1964.  We estimate Newey-West standard errors allowing for first order 
autocorrelation.  
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consistent than one might like.
35   We consider two samples: a shorter one (1961-2004) that 
includes all these variables, and a longer one that includes the variables available for the entire 
sample of the dependent variable.  This is 1932-2005 for all four series plus 1900-2005 for 
homicide. 
  The results are consistent with the conclusions derived above from the univariate 
correlations.  The arrest rate enters significantly but with the wrong sign.  Police per capita never 
enters significantly and is typically the wrong sign. The execution rate never enters significantly 
and is sometimes the wrong sign.  Greater incarceration does correlate with lower crime in the 
shorter sample but not in the longer samples, consistent with the graphical evidence above. 
  RTC laws are consistently correlated with lower crime, but the correlation is about as 
negative for property crime as for violent crime, which is not consistent with the LM hypothesis.  
Guns are positively correlated with crime for all four crime series, but again the correlation is 
particularly strong for property crime, which is counterintuitive. Abortion enters with the wrong 
sign, sometimes significantly. Lead enters positively, consistent with the Reyes/Levin view, but 
the effect is never significant.   It is also largest in magnitude for property crime, which is the 
opposite of the Reyes result and inconsistent with the view that lead poisoning promotes 
aggression in particular.  
  Enforcement of prohibition is associated with greater crime in all but one regression, and 
most of the coefficients are significant.  In particular, for overall violent crime and 
murder/homicide in the longer samples, the coefficients are consistently positive and significant. 
  As noted, one should not draw structural conclusions from these regressions, but they are 
not consistent with the view that standard deterrence variables, as well as other factors recently 
addressed in the economics of crime literature, are robust determinants of crime.  At the same 
time, they are consistent with the view that drug prohibition enforcement plays an important role, 
                                                 
35 On the role of the age structure, see Levitt (1999) and de Melo (2007).  For recent evidence on the role of 
education, see Lochner (2004). 22 




  The economic model of crime first posited in 1968 has spurred a large literature that tries 
to estimate the empirically relevant determinants of crime.  This paper has examined aggregate 
data for first-order evidence on these determinants; these data, however, provide little 
confirmation that these determinants have a significant impact on long-run trends or major 
differences across countries.  While this does not mean these theories are wrong, we believe that 
any estimation finding a strong effect not seen in the aggregate data deserves careful scrutiny. 
  We do find one theory that is consistent with the aggregate time series and cross-country 
data on crime: the view that enforcement of drug prohibition encourages violent dispute 
resolution.  
  This perspective is also consistent with phenomena beyond those typically labeled 
“crime.” Acts of terrorism, civil unrest, and civil war can be thought of as dispute resolution.  
These activities are more likely when, on the one hand, more disputes exist because of policies 
that provide the basis for such disputes (e.g., laws mandating one religion or language).  These 
activities are also more likely when, on the other hand, groups that disagree with government 
policies have few non-violent mechanisms for expressing their grievances.   Thus, an alternative 
perspective to the deterrence model, at least for much violent crime, is one that examines how 
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Table 1: Homicides per 100,000 population, Various Countries, around 2001 
          
United States        7.06         
          
OECD Countries         
Australia        1.57   Hungary        2.43   New Zealand        1.43  
Austria        0.95   Iceland        0.70   Norway        0.73  
Belgium        1.74   Ireland        1.04   Poland        1.72  
Canada        1.49   Italy        0.97   Portugal        1.30  
Czech Republic        1.32   Japan        0.58   Slovakia        2.06  
Denmark        1.26   Korea        1.59   Spain        1.03  
Finland        2.97  
Luxembour
g        2.04   Sweden        0.97  
France        0.83   Mexico      10.10   Switzerland        1.13  
Germany        0.68  
Netherland
s        1.26   UK        0.40  
Greece        1.05          
OECD Average       1.62          
          
Other countries           
Albania        7.17   Croatia        1.96   Romania        3.49  
Argentina        6.93   Cuba        5.38   Russian Federation      29.85  
Armenia        1.76   Estonia      15.17   Serbia and Montenegro        2.92  
Azerbaijan        2.59   Georgia        3.92   Singapore        0.75  
Bahamas      20.79   Hong Kong        0.77   Slovenia        0.80  
Barbados      10.47   Israel        5.64   Tajikistan        2.47  
Belarus      11.23   Kazakhstan      15.52   Macedonia        6.44  
Brazil      26.37   Kuwait        1.74   Thailand        5.65  
Bulgaria        3.08   Kyrgyzstan        6.72   Trinidad and Tobago        8.52  
Cayman Islands      11.51   Latvia      12.31   Turkmenistan        7.07  
Chile        9.98   Lithuania      10.23   Ukraine      12.65  
China        1.98   Malta        2.29   Uruguay        5.54  
Colombia      62.38   Mauritius        2.78   Uzbekistan        3.13  
Costa Rica        6.05   Moldova      11.21   Venezuela      26.23  
Other Average       9.37              
Source: WHO. Most figures constructed from WHO Mortality database. Data for Mauritius and 
Denmark are for 2000; data for China for 1999; data for Belgium (1997). Some figures 
constructed from Table 1 of WHOSIS these include Mexico, New Zealand (2000), Argentina, 
Bahamas (2000), Barbados (2000), Brazil (2000),Cayman Islands (2000), Chile, Colombia (1999), 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Thailand (2000), Trinidad and Tobago (1998), Turkmenistan (1998), Uruguay 
(2000), Uzbekistan (2000), and Venezuela (2000). No data were available for a nearby year for 
Turkey. Population for the Cayman Island's from the CIA World Factbook. 
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Table 2: Multivariate Regressions of U.S. Crime Rates on Potential Determinants 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
 Property  Crime  Violent  Crimes Murders  Homicides 
    1961-2004 1932-2005 1961-2004  1932-2005 1961-2004 1932-2005  1961-2004 1932-2005 1900-2005 
trend  0.0317 0.0369  0.0546 0.0448 0.0276  0.0178 0.0248 0.0241  0.0316 
  (1.49) (9.64)  (1.81) (6.90) (0.94)  (3.05) (0.77) (4.06)  (3.32) 
ln(GNP per capita)  0.2625  -0.3541  0.8808  -0.4337 0.7434  -0.1787 0.8491 -0.6114  -1.1302 
  (0.52) (2.83)  (1.45) (2.01) (1.41)  (0.98) (1.48) (3.52)  (3.16) 
%  aged  15-24  1.2754 5.6154  -3.7314 4.3692 -5.7484  5.2577 -6.7234 7.9815  5.6972 
  (0.51) (6.07)  (1.44) (2.85) (2.09)  (4.76) (2.30) (6.75)  (3.86) 
prohibition expenditures per capitat-1  3.2995  7.5471  -0.1931 21.6664 9.8620  15.6705 2.7608 14.6486 21.3226 
  (0.81) (1.55)  (0.04) (2.56) (2.14)  (2.62) (0.48) (2.27)  (3.51) 
% covered by right to carryt-1  -0.3932 -1.7027  -0.2082 -2.4350 -0.4089 -1.6177  -0.4830 -1.8579 -2.2918 
  (1.53) (5.79)  (0.69) (4.52) (1.19)  (3.53) (1.15) (2.70)  (4.64) 
incarceration ratet-1  -0.0036 -0.0002  -0.0061 -0.0004 -0.0066 -0.0008  -0.0060 0.0001   
  (2.22) (0.31)  (3.80) (0.42) (3.89)  (0.92) (3.10) (0.13)   
executions per capitat-1  -441.6479 -43.7983  -263.9329 80.5164 -531.6189 158.1099  -376.5246 123.3264   
  (1.79) (0.66)  (0.71) (0.67) (1.76)  (1.46) (1.02) (1.16)   
abortion (thousands)t-20  0.000304   0.000364  0.000525   0.000624  0.000022   
  (1.69)   (1.83)  (2.76)   (2.65)  (0.08)   
arrest ratet-1  0.0005   0.0030  0.0468   0.0417    
  (2.36)   (3.15)  (3.51)   (2.68)    
police per capitat-1  -0.0168   0.0304  0.0127   0.0835    
  (0.10)   (0.16)  (0.07)   (0.52)    
guns per capitat-1  0.0052   0.0035  0.0068   0.0012    
  (2.47)   (1.54)  (2.46)   (0.27)    
% high school graduate or more  -0.0309    -0.0320    -0.0448    -0.0094     
  (1.27)   (1.33)  (1.92)   (0.34)    
leadt-20  0.1091   0.0707  0.0503   0.0526    
  (1.10)   (0.55)  (0.43)   (0.43)    
Constant  -56.1936 -62.1396  -108.3916  -78.9484 -56.8818  -32.3040 -53.4762 -40.9172  -50.2325 
  (1.37) (9.45)  (1.92) (7.02) (1.06)  (3.20) (0.91) (3.95)  (3.28) 
Observations  44 74  44 74 44  74 44 74 105 
Newey-West t statistics in parentheses                 
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Property Crime per 100,000 Violent Crime per 100,000
 
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (various years). 32 


























homicide rate murder rate
 
Souce: Vital Statistics, Eckberg (1995), FBI UCR 33 
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Source: World Health Organization (WHO) 
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City Violent Crime Arrest Rate US Violent Crime Rate
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Source: FBI UCR (various years)35 















































police employees per 1,000 police officers per 1,000 Index I Crime Rate
 
Sources: FBI UCR (various years). 36 
 














































Index I Crime Rate Incarceration Rate
 
Sources: Index I Crime Rate - FBI UCR (various years).  Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online 
(www.albany.edu/sourcebook/wk1/t628.wk1)37 
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Figure 7c: OECD Homicides per Capita and Prisoners per Capita 






















































Sources: International prisoners data from OECD Factbook 2007: Economic, Environmental and 
Social Statistics and Walmsley (2004). Homicides from WHO. 39 











































































executions homicides per 100,000
 
Source: Espy, M. Watt, and John Ortiz Smykla. EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1608-2002: THE ESPY FILE [Computer file]. 4th 
ICPSR ed. Compiled by M. Watt Espy and John Ortiz Smykla, University of Alabama. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2004.  Vital Statistics Homicides adjusted by Eckberg (1995).   40 



















































homicides per 100,000 executions
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Sources: Canadian executions: 1926-1960 from Historical Statistics of Canada; 1961-1962 from http://geocities.com/ 
richard.clark32@btinternet.com/canada.htm. Extended time series of homicides for Canada also from the Historical Statistics of Canada. UK 
executions from http://www.murderfile.net 
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Fraction of Population Covered by Shall-Issue Laws Homicide Rate
 
Source: Grossman and Lee (2008) and annual state population estimates from the Census Bureau. Vital Statistics homicides adjusted by Eckberg 
(1995). 43 


























































Stock Handguns per 1,000 pop Violent Crime Rate
 
Sources: Gun data from Kleck, Gary (1997). Targeting Guns: Firearms and their Control. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter (updated with 
additional data from author). FBI UCR (various years) for the Index Crime Rate. 44 































































CDC abortions lagged 20 years Violent Crime Rate





















































CDC abortions lagged 20 years Property Crime Rate







































CDC abortions lagged 20 years Murder Rate
 
Source: CDC abortions figures from "Abortion Surveillance" (various years) published in various 
issued of the MMWR. 45 
 
Figure 13: Homicide Rate Time Series and Legalization of Abortion 
 
 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          














































































































































































































          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          




          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
Note: Black vertical line indicates legalization of abortion; red vertical line indicates 20 years 
later.  
Sources: Homicide figures from WHO. 
 49 
 







































































Gasoline Lead (ktons per million population) lagged 20 years Murders per 100,000
 
Sources: Aggregate lead data from Reyes, Jessica “Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The impact of childhood lead exposure on Crime,” 
NBER WP#13097, May 2007. 50 
 


















































































































Sources: Automobile/fuel usage data are from the Historical Statistics of the United States. 51 

































































Homicide Rate per capita prohibition enforcement expenditures
 
Sources: Homicide Rate from FBI UCR (various years). Projected prohibition enforcement expenditures based on Miron (1999) with data from the 
Budget of the United States Government (various years). 